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Abstract
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist
without commitment power has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that
make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall protability. In this paper, I re-
consider the above hypothesis by examining the role of competition in a monopolists
upgrade decision. I nd that, when a system add-on is competitively supplied, a mo-
nopolist chooses to tie the add-on to a new system that is only backward compatible,
even if a commitment of not introducing the new system is available and socially op-
timal. Tying facilitates a price squeeze. (JEL D40, L00, L40)
Keywords: Compatibility, Durable Goods, Network Externalities, Planned Obsoles-
cence, Tying.
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When a model was settled upon then every improvement on that model should
be interchangeable with the old model, so that a car should never get out of date.
(Henry Ford, My Life and Work, Chapter III)
Consumers clearly think the price/value proposition of a Windows upgrade is
excellent. Millions have bought upgrades, even though their PCs would continue
to operate perfectly with their original operating system. (Bill Gates, "Compete,
Dont Delete", The Economist, 06/13/98)
Consider a monopoly system maker in a market that lasts two periods. In the rst period
the rm sells the rst-generation of its system A; which is perfectly durable. In the second
period the rm develops a new feature, B. It can either sell B as a separate product or sell
a new system (A0B) that integrates B. Which way is more protable? In this paper, I show
that when competing with an independent supplier of B; a system maker earns a higher
prot by selling A0B that is only backward compatible with A; even though selling B as a
separate product is socially optimal.
Many durable goods producers frequently introduce upgrades that incorporate new fea-
tures. Rather than o¤ering a new feature as a separate product, rms often integrate it
into a new system and make it unavailable to owners of the old system. For instance, when
Microsoft released Windows XP, a number of applications such as Windows Media Player 8,
Windows Movie Maker and Wireless Conguration Utility were introduced, but they could
not be installed on previous versions of Windows.1 In order to use these applications, a user
would have to upgrade the whole operating system.2
Since many of the new features can be unbundled from theWindows operating system and
each of them can be sold as an individual application, how does Microsoft gain an advantage
by tying them to the purchase of a new system? Certainly there are technical reasons why
upgrades are delivered this way, especially if an upgrade is a complete overhaul of the original
1"Want Media Player 8? Buy Windows XP", Joe Wilcox, CNET News, April 24, 2001; "Windows XP:
The big squeeze?", Joe Wilcox, CNET News, May 21, 2001.
2For a more detailed discussion of Microsofts bundling strategy, see Section I.
system that cannot be accomplished by merely adding individual applications. The main
contribution of this paper is to show that, even when technically feasible, a monopoly system
maker may choose not to o¤er new features separately from the system because tying allows
the monopolist to exploit network externalities and extract rents from third-party providers.
I rst examine the case in which a monopoly system maker is also the only supplier of an
application and consumers di¤er in their willingnesses to pay for the application. When there
are network e¤ects between users of the same system, tying the application to the purchase
of a new system that is only backward compatible increases sales, as even low-valuation
consumers upgrade for fear of losing network benets. However, forward-looking consumers
will pay less for the original system thus lowering the monopolists overall protability.
Therefore, a monopolist will commit not to introduce bundled upgrades.
I then turn to the case in which the monopoly system maker faces competition from an
independent supplier in the application market, a case that is more relevant to Microsoft. I
nd that a commitment to tying emerges as a protable strategy. By integrating its appli-
cation into a new system, the system maker turns the competition between two applications
into a competition between two systems. This change intensies the competition for market
share, crucial in the presence of network externalities, and lowers the prices of applications
thus allowing the system maker to charge a higher price for the original system. In other
words, the system maker uses tying to engage in a price squeeze (Ordover, Sykes and Willig,
1985) and capture the surplus created by entry of the independent supplier. I nd that this
price squeeze strategy is most e¤ective when the new system is only backward compatible,
but it lowers social welfare.
In both cases, tying entails (full) incompatibility between the system makers own ap-
plication and its old system. This, coupled with incompatibility between the two systems,3
changes a users incentive to upgrade. Without tying, a user can buy the application and
keep the old system, hence all users remain on the same network and reap maximal network
3Backward compatibility, as formally dened later in the paper, implies partial incompatibility.
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benets. Tying induces users who have higher values for the application to migrate to a new
system, thus depriving non-upgrading users of network benets. This forces some users to
buy the upgrade they dont need or buy the "wrong upgrade" if there are competing o¤ers.
The traditional explanation for bundling is that it serves as an e¤ective tool of price dis-
crimination by a monopolist (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Schmalensee, 1982; McAfee, McMillan
andWhinston, 1989; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999), but this does not explain the use of pure
bundling because mixed bundling gives the monopolist more freedom to price discriminate.
Following the seminal contribution by Whinston (1990), a number of papers (Choi and
Stefanadis, 2001; Carlton and Waldman, 2002, 2006; Nalebu¤, 2004) demonstrate the use
of tying to extend a rms monopoly power from one market to another.4 However, they
have had limited success in explaining Microsofts tying behavior. Their models assume a
physical tie that involves incompatibility with a rivals product, but Microsoft seems to have
introduced relatively little incompatibility between its operating system and third-party
applications (Whinston, 2001). These models also rely on the entry deterrence e¤ect of
tying,5 but its rivals were already active in their respective markets when Microsoft started
the practice.6 These facts, however, are consistent with my model, which suggests that
tying can facilitate rent extraction by a monopoly system maker, who therefore has an
incentive to accommodate entry. In this sense, my paper is close in spirit to Farrell and
Katz (2000), who study a single producer of component A and several independent suppliers
of a complementary component B. They show that the monopolist may have incentives to
integrate into supply of componentB so as to better extract e¢ ciency rents in the competitive
sector.
4Other important contributions include Choi (1996, 2004), who focuses on the long-term impact of tying
on competition through innovation.
5In Nalebu¤ (2004), bundling can be protable even if entry deterrence fails, but good A in his model
is not essential to the use of good B. Therefore, his model ts well with Microsofts bundling of Microsoft
O¢ ce products but less so with its bundling applications into the operating system.
6"Is Microsoft Driving Innovation Or Playing Catch-Up With Rivals?", Reply All, The Wall Street Jour-
nal, Dec. 1, 2006.
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The idea that tying can facilitate a price squeeze has also been independently developed
by Gans (2007) and Carlton, Gans and Waldman (2007). In both their models and mine,
tying can be ine¢ cient even when it does not lead to foreclosure. However, there are two
key di¤erences between their models and mine: rst, in their models tying is used only if the
tie creates economic value and thus is socially e¢ cient in the absence of a rival producer;
second, tying in their models is equivalent to bundling hence unbundling such as the one
mandated by the European Commission may have a positive e¤ect on welfare, but in mine
tying is mainly a commitment of incompatibility hence an order to unbundle but without
compatibility requirement is completely ine¤ective.7
There is an extensive literature on competition between networks, but most of it focuses
on the coordination-game aspect and considers network e¤ects that are signicant enough to
generate a winner-takes-all outcome. Relatively few models examine competitions with weak
network externalities that lead to segmented networks, despite their wide existence. A recent
paper by Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) studies a spatial duopoly model with consumption
externalities. They nd that, when the network e¤ect is present but not too strong, product
di¤erentiation can sustain both rms but price competition is ercer and results in lower
prices.8 A similar result is obtained in my paper.
Finally, the idea that a durable goods producer with network externalities may choose
to make a new product incompatible with its old ones is related to the literature on planned
obsolescence, originated by Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994).9 They nd that a monopolist
has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete, and this
reduces its overall protability. Most closely related to my paper is the second model of Elli-
son and Fudenberg (2000),10 which attributes excessive upgrades to consumer heterogeneity:
a monopolists incentive to upgrade depends on the marginal consumers valuation, but so-
7See a more detailed discussion on EUs mandatary unbundling in Section IV.C.
8This result is also obtained in Shy (2001), Armstrong (2006), Doganoglu and Wright (2006).
9Other important contributions to this literature include Waldman (1996), Fishman and Rob (2000),
Kumar (2002), and Nahm (2004).
10In their rst model, Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) examine the consumerscoordination problem in detail
and show that the monopoly outcome can be upgrades when the social optimum is incompatible networks.
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cial welfare depends on the average consumer, therefore the monopolists choice generally
deviates from the social optimal. My paper extends the literature in two directions. First,
my model highlights the role of tying and endogenizes the monopolists choice of compati-
bility.11 Second, I consider the role of competition in the market for upgrades; this allows
me to show that a monopoly system maker may introduce ine¢ cient upgrades, even if a
commitment not to do so is available and socially optimal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section I provides some evidence
to motivate my model. Section II introduces the basic model. Section III examines the
commitment problem of a monopoly system maker when it is also the only supplier of
applications. Section IV analyzes the choices of tying and compatibility by a monopoly
system maker when it competes with an independent supplier of applications. Section V
considers several extensions. Section VI concludes. Any formal proofs omitted from the
main text are contained in the appendix.
I. Motivation
In this section, I briey review two cases that seemed to broadly t the assumptions of
this paper: both rms sell systems that constitute a platform for applications; both are
dominant players in their respective markets; product innovations are rapid and users place
considerable emphasis on compatibility between generations of products. It is worth noting,
however, many details in these cases are not captured by the simple model presented in this
paper, and no claim is made to explain fully the observed behavior. Rather, the cases are
used to motivate the central thesis of this paper that the choices of tying and compatibility is
as much a way to change the rules of the game in the application market as it is determined
by technology advances in systems.
11Choi (1994) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) informally discuss why backward compatibility is preferred
to full incompatibility. Lee (2006) formalizes this idea and analyzes a monopolists choice of compatibility
between its successive generations of products, but he only compares three special cases. All these models
assume within generation consumer homogeneity, so their analyses and welfare implications are very di¤erent
from mine. None of these models consider the role of competition in the monopolists upgrade decision.
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A. Microsofts Tying Strategy
Microsofts bundling of numerous applications into its Windows operating system has been
well documented, but one aspect of its tying strategy has largely escaped notice: Microsoft
applications bundled in a new system are often unavailable to users of old systems, who
therefore must upgrade their systems in order to use these applications. While this up-
grading strategy can be dictated by technical considerations, the following evidence suggests
economic motives may also play a role.
First, there is anecdotal evidence that Microsoft intentionally cripples software programs
so that they cannot be installed on old operating systems. In one instance, after removing one
line of code that checks the version of Windows, users are able to install Windows Defender,
a security software, onto Windows 2000 despite Microsofts claim to the contrary.12
Second, third-party applications have been able to provide better compatibility with dif-
ferent versions of the Windows operating system than Microsofts own applications. Take for
example media players:13 the left column in Table 1 lists the dates and system requirements
of major releases of Windows Media Player (WMP) and its main competitor, RealPlayer,
in the last decade;14 the right column is derived from the left and lists the "obsolescence
dates" of Windows operating systems, dened as the release date of a media player that
discontinues its support of the OS.15
An interesting pattern emerges: RealPlayer consistently supports more versions of the
Windows OS than Microsofts own WMP, although Microsoft often rationalizes its bundling
strategy by claiming that its own applications can best utilize the operating system. In
12Brian Livingston, "Microsoft Turns Up The Heat On Windows 2000 Users", Information Week, Dec.
15, 2006.
13It should be noted that the media player market is also an example of two-sided markets, in which content
providers and nal consumers constitute the two sides that trade with each other. Two-sided markets are
characterized by indirect network e¤ects, a feature not accounted for in my model. Choi (2006) provides a
careful analysis of tying that takes into account the peculiarities of two-sided markets.
14The information presented in this table has been obtained from news wires and articles on Lexis-Nexis.
15Microsoft received heavy criticism after releasing WMP 8, which was only available on Windows XP.
WMP 9, which supported older versions of Windows, was released more than a year after the launch of
Windows XP.
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Release Date Media player System
Requirement
1995 WMP 5.1 Windows 95
Late 1997 RealPlayer 5 Windows 3.1
June 1998 WMP 6 Windows 95
July 1998 RealPlayer 6 Windows 95
Nov. 1999 RealPlayer 7 Windows 95
June 2000 RealPlayer 8 Windows 95
July 2000 WMP 7 Windows 98
Oct. 2001 WMP 8 Windows XP
Dec. 2001 RealOne (v9) Windows NT
Jan. 2003 WMP 9 Windows 98
April 2004 RealPlayer 10 Windows NT
Oct. 2004 WMP 10 Windows XP
Windows
Version
Obsolescence Date
in WMP
Obsolescence Date
in RealPlayer
3.1 1995 July 1998
95 July 2000 Dec. 2001
NT 4.0a July 2000 current
98 Oct. 2001 current
ME Oct. 2001 current
2000b Oct. 2001 current
XPc Current current
a;bWindows NT and 2000 are intended for professional usage.
cWindows XP has both home and professional editions.
Table 1: Release dates and system requirements of major releases of WMP and RealPlayer,
1995-2005.
July 2000, Microsoft released WMP 7, which was bundled into Windows ME but could not
be installed on Windows 95.16 Almost concurrently, RealPlayer 8 was released and still
supported Windows 95. The introduction of WMP 8 and RealPlayer 9, by Microsoft and
RealNetworks respectively, follows a similar pattern.
B. SAPs Commitment to a "Stable Core"
In contrast, SAP AG, a leading provider of business software, recently announced a major
shift in its upgrading strategy. It promised to keep the current version of its agship product,
mySAP ERP 2005, in place for the next 5 years, breaking with the traditional approach of
upgrading the entire software release every 12 to 18 months.17 The company would instead
release optional enhancement packages that add new functionalities in certain business areas.
Customers can cherry-pick the ones they want to implement and ignore ones they dont. In
other words, customers can access new features without overhauling their core systems.
16"Microsoft Windows Media Player 7 Brings Click and Play Digital Media To Millions Around the Globe",
Microsoft Corporation, Press Release, July 17, 2000.
17"SAP promises no major software release until 2010", TechTarget, Sep. 13, 2006; "SAPs ERP 2005
stable corefor ve years", InfoWorld, Sep. 12, 2006.
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Notably, SAPs change in upgrading policy took place after a period of rapid consolida-
tion, during which many software vendors that specialize in particular applications exit the
industry amid a tech slump.18
In sum, two observations can be made from the above cases: rst, a system maker may
have an incentive to introduce incompatibility between its own applications and systems;
second, the incentive to tie applications to a new system is stronger as the potential for add-
on competition rises. A model that attempts to account for these observations is presented
below.
II. Basic Setup
I consider a two-period model, with periods t = 1 and t = 2 (see Figure 1). In period 1,
a monopolist produces the rst generation of the system (A). In period 2, the monopolist
develops a new application; it can either introduce a system upgrade that integrates the
application (A0B) or sell the application as a separate product (B).19 If it chooses the rst
option, the monopolist can also manipulate the degree of compatibility between the new
system, A0B; and the old system, A. I assume that both developing an application and
developing an upgrade involve xed costs that are so small as not to a¤ect the monopolists
upgrade decision.20 In addition, I normalize the marginal costs of all production to zero.
There is a continuum of consumers who enter the market in period 1: Each consumer
buys at most one unit of A in period 1 and one unit of either B or A0B in period 2. I assume
that consumers have quasi-linear preferences, so their utilities can be measured in monetary
units.
18"SAP: A Software Giant Rarinto Grow", BusinessWeek, June 23, 2003.
19I call B an application in order to provide concreteness, but B can refer to any new features or improve-
ments that increase the value of a system. See footnote 21 for further discussion.
20A positive xed cost will certainly reduce the monopolists incentive to introduce an upgrade, but this
e¤ect is quite obvious. However, the xed cost of developing an application by a competitive supplier will
play an important role in determining the optimal degree of compatibility when I consider the price squeeze
e¤ect of bundling in Section IV.
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T=1 Price of A
Price of B
Consumer purchase
Consumer upgrade
T=2
Price of A’B
Compatibility (A’B, A)
A’BB
Figure 1: A Two-period Model
To model network externalities, I assume that users of each system constitute a network
and that a member of network i derives a network benet of N(
MX
j=1
aijxj) from M available
networks, where xj is the number of users on network j and aij is the network e¤ect from
network j to members of network i: I assume that N(0) = 0; N 0 > 0; aij 2 [0; 1], and aii = 1
for all i: I allow for partial compatibility, i.e., aij < 1 for some j 6= i: When aij takes the
value of either 0 or 1; I obtain three special cases discussed in the literature:
 Full compatibility, aij = 1 for all i and j:
 Full incompatibility, aij = 0 for all j 6= i:
 One-way compatibility, aij = 0 and aji = 1; e.g., users of network i benet only from
other users of the same network, while users of network j get the full network benets
from users of both networks; if network j is a newer version of the system than network
i, then one-way compatibility implies backward but not forward compatibility.
I assume that the "base value", independent of network externalities, of A0B is the sum
of two components, vA
0B = vA + u; where vA is the base value of A and u is the value of B.
This specication means that, compared with B; the introduction of A0B adds nothing but a
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channel through which A is made obsolete.21 It is in this sense that an upgrade (A! A0) is
called ine¢ cient. I further assume that vA is the same across all consumers. This assumption
guarantees that consumersvaluations of A0B are perfectly correlated with their valuations
of B. Besides simplifying the analysis, this assumption ensures that the incentive to bundle
B cannot be attributed to price discrimination. I also suppose that vA is so high that all
consumers make purchases in the rst period (no monopoly exclusion). It is easy to see
that the absolute size of vA as well as the rst-period network benets are immaterial to my
analysis, so I normalize them to 0 in order to cut down the number of parameters of which
we keep track. For the same reason, I suppose that there is no discount between periods for
both consumers and rms.
Last, I assume that the monopolist can prevent consumers from delaying their purchases
by o¤ering an upgrade price only available to owners of the rst-generation system,22 but
the upgrade price is not set until period 2.23
A. Compatibility
Before proceeding to my analysis, I pause a moment to discuss the link between tying and
compatibility. Whinston (1990) argues that the e¤ectiveness of tying largely depends on
whether a system maker can make a commitment to tie through product design, in particular
its choice of compatibility. This means that the tying decision, at its core, is a choice of
compatibility. In this paper, it is the (in)compatibility between the application, B; and
21This assumption is without loss of generality. According to the goods-characteristics approach, products
can be viewed as bundles of characteristics they embody (Lancaster 1966). Taking this approach, we can
view B as simply a combination of features not included in A:
22It is a standard assumption used in the durable goods literature, e.g., Waldman (1993), Choi (1994),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000). It is also a routine practice adopted by real
world manufacturers. For example, Windows XP Home Edition costs $99 for the upgrade version and $199
for rst-time installers. Laura Rohde, "Microsoft Reveals Windows XP Prices", PC World, August 24, 2001.
If this assumption is not satised, then the results will change slightly in the monopoly case, but will be
quite di¤erent in the competitive case. See footnote 26 and Section IV.B for more details.
23The assumption that the monopolist cannot commit to future prices is not important in my analysis of
the monopoly case: its choices of tying and compatibility will not change if the monopolist gains the ability
to make a price commitment (see the proof of Proposition 2), but is crucial in my analysis of the competitive
case (See Section IV.B for further discussion). A possible justication for this assumption is that such a
commitment may reduce the system makers incentive to invest in R&D.
11
the original system, A: Note that this is di¤erent from the choice of compatibility between
the two systems, A0B and A : while the former necessitates a competition between the two
systems, the latter regulates the intensity of that competition. At the same time, both can
potentially, and indeed do in this paper, lead to incompatibility between a system makers
own products.
III. Monopoly Pricing
In this section I show that, when consumers di¤er in their willingness to pay for B, a monop-
olist increases its second-period prot by tying B to the purchase of a system upgrade that
is only backward compatible. This, however, lowers the monopolists overall protability,
therefore it has an incentive to make a commitment not to tie. To model consumer hetero-
geneity, I assume that their reservation prices of B are represented by the distribution F (u),
strictly increasing with continuous density on the closed interval [a; b].
A. The Second Period
In period 2, if the monopolist sells B, then all users will keep the original system A and
stay on the same network; a consumer of type u obtains a utility of N(1) from continued
use of A and obtains u +N(1) from adding B. But if the monopolist sells A0B, then there
will be two networks of users. Let users of A0B be network 1 and those of A be network 2;
a consumer of type u obtains a utility of N(
2X
j=1
a2jxj) from continued use of A and obtains
u+N(
2X
j=1
a1jxj) from upgrading to A0B.24
Because of the coordination-gameaspect of network e¤ects, it is possible that multiple
equilibria exist. Moreover, consumers with di¤erent valuations may not have the same
ordering of the possible equilibria, so one cannot use a Pareto criterion to select between
the equilibria. Following Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), I assume that network e¤ects are
24This corresponds to the additive specicationin Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
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so small compared to other factors that the upgrade price leads to a unique equilibrium
allocation,25 in which only users who value A0B above some ~u choose to upgrade.
The monopolists problem involves two choices: tying and compatibility, but only the
latter is pivotal according to the following equivalence result.
Lemma 1 Selling B is equivalent to selling A0B that is fully compatible with A.26
Proof. Obvious.
If A0B is fully compatible with A, then consumers receive the same network benets from
using either version, so their upgrade decision will be purely driven by their valuations of
B; whether B is tied makes no di¤erence. Hence we can focus on the monopolists choice of
compatibility while taking its use of tying as given. If the solution entails full compatibility,
then it implies unbundling as another solution. Lemma 1 not only helps me streamline the
exposition, but also shows that tying is an e¤ective strategy only if the system maker can
exploit network externalities by manipulating the degree of compatibility between its own
systems.
Proposition 1 The monopolist maximizes its second-period prot by selling A0B that is only
backward compatible, i.e., a12 = 1 and a21 = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the monopolist sells A0B: Without upgrading, a user gets NfF (~u) +
a21[1 F (~u)]g; after upgrading, one gets u p+Nfa12F (~u)+[1 F (~u)]g; where p is the price
of upgrade. Hence we must have p = Nfa12F (~u)+[1 F (~u)]g NfF (~u)+a21[1 F (~u)]g+~u
and jt=2 =
max~u(Nfa12F (~u) + [1 F (~u)]g NfF (~u) + a21[1 F (~u)]g+ ~u)[1 F (~u)]: Denote by u the
25The precise condition for this to hold depends on the functional forms of N() and F (); which are not
specied to allow for generality. See Example 1 for one specication.
26The equivalence result breaks down if (i) the marginal costs of production are positive and thus an
integrated system is more costly to produce than a standalone application; (ii) the system maker cannot
prevent consumers from delaying their purchases by o¤ering discounts to upgrading users; or (iii) there are
new system buyers in the second period. In both case (i) and (ii), the unbundling solution will then dominate
the full compatibility solution; case (iii) is discussed in an extension of the model (Section V.C).
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optimal choice of ~u: Applying the envelope theorem, we get @
@a21
jt=2 =  [1 F (u)]2N 0 < 0
and @
@a12
jt=2 = F (u)[1 F (u)]N 0 > 0: Therefore, a choice of a12 = 1 and a21 = 0 (backward
compatibility) maximizes jt=2. We can also rule out selling B alone based on Lemma 1.
The systemmaker faces a classic time inconsistency problem: once old units are sold, then
a durable goods monopolist has a strong incentive to retire the old units in order to generate
new sales. In my model, the system maker pushes users to abandon the original system by
exploiting network externalities and consumer heterogeneity. Due to network externalities,
the value of a system depends on the number of users. The upgrading decision of users
who have high values for the application imposes a negative externality on low valuation
users, some of whom are "forced" to upgrade because it is too costly to be left behind. As a
result, the original system is made obsolete even though it is perfectly durable. My model,
however, does not require the existence of new consumers, as is typically assumed in models
of planned obsolescence.
Example 1 Suppose that u  U [0; 1] and N(x) = nx, where n < 1=2: An equilibrium in
which some but not all users upgrade exists: Further suppose that n = 1=3: If B is sold as a
separate product, then 1=2 of the consumers buy it and the monopolist earns a prot of 1=4.
If B is bundled into a backward but not forward compatible upgrade A0B, then 3=4 of the
consumers upgrade and the monopolists prot is 3=8; a 50% increase.
B. The First Period
The time inconsistency problem faced by the monopolist implies that the policy optimal in
the short term may not be desirable in a long run perspective. Indeed, the introduction
of a backward but not forward compatible upgrade reduces a non-upgrading usersnetwork
benets and their willingness to pay for the original system, thus lowering the monopolists
total prots. Therefore,
14
Proposition 2 To maximize total prots, the monopolist commits to either selling B alone
or selling A0B that is fully compatible with A:27
Proof. First, I show that full compatibility maximizes its total prots if the monopolist
can commit to an upgrade price. With tying, a non-upgrading consumer obtains a network
benet of NfF (~u) + a21[1   F (~u)] in period 2, so the monopolists total prots are  =
max~u(Nfa12F (~u)+ [1 F (~u)]g NfF (~u)+a21[1 F (~u)]g+ ~u)[1 F (~u)]+NfF (~u)+a21[1 
F (~u)]g = max~uNfa12F (~u)+[1 F (~u)]g[1 F (~u)]+F (~u)NfF (~u)+a21[1 F (~u)]g+~u[1 F (~u)].
By the envelope theorem, @
@a12
= @
@a21
= F (~u)[1   F (~u)]N 0 > 0. Therefore, a12 = a21 = 1
(full compatibility) maximizes the monopoly prots.
Comparing jt=2 and  when a12 = a21 = 1; we can see that they di¤er by a constant
N(1): This means that any upgrade price that maximizes jt=2 also maximizes : Therefore,
by committing to full compatibility, the monopolist can obtain the maximal prot without
necessarily committing to an upgrade price.
Last, by Lemma 1, selling B alone also achieves the full compatibility outcome.
Since the monopolist internalizes users loss of network benets, introducing frequent
upgrades lowers its own protability. Therefore, it will be better o¤ by choosing actions
that constrain its own ability to introduce upgrades. This is by now a standard result, as
shown by Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994). However, rms like Microsoft do not seem to be
taking any such actions, it is therefore worthwhile to examine their actions from a di¤erent
perspective (Waldman, 2003).
IV. A Competitive Supplier
Now I turn to the case in which the system maker competes with an independent supplier
in the application market. I consider the following game (see Figure 2): the system maker
sells A in period 1 and sells B or A0B in period 2; at the beginning of period 1, the system
27It is worth noting that the commitment outcome can also be obtained if the monopolist does not sell
but leases its product.
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T=1 B or A’B
Price of A
Consumer purchase
Consumer upgrade
T=2 Price of A’B
Compatibility (A’B, A)
Price of B’
Invest in B’
Figure 2: Competition with an Independent Supplier
maker sets the price of A and announces its choices of tying and compatibility for a future
upgrade; consumers then make purchases; at the beginning of period 2, an independent
supplier can enter the market by spending F to develop a competing application, B0; also
produced at zero marginal cost. The entry cost F is common knowledge to all participants
in the market.28
To study the competition in the application market, I consider a variation of the standard
linear city model. I assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on a line [0; 1] and that
the two rms are located at the opposite ends of the line, with the system maker at 0 and
the independent supplier at 1. Consumers have the same reservation price for an application
o¤ered by either rm, but a consumer incurs a transportation cost of td when buying from
a rm located at a distance of d. I assume that F < t=2 so that entry is not blockaded.
Firms set prices simultaneously. I assume that transportation costs are small compared to
a consumers reservation price so the price competition game has a pure strategy equilibrium,
in which the application market is covered. In addition, consumers derive network benets
from other users of the same system. For tractability, I assume that network benets are
linear in the size of a network, i.e., N(x) = nx: Again, I assume that network e¤ects are
28The case in which F is private information is solved in Section V.B.
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su¢ ciently small, i.e., n < t; such that a unique equilibrium exists in which consumers in [0; x]
buy from the system maker (network 1) and consumers in [x; 1] buy from the independent
supplier (network 2). The solution concept that I use is subgame perfect equilibrium.
It is easy to see that Lemma 1 still holds in the case studied here, so I focus on the system
makers choice of compatibility while taking its use of tying as given. Following Whinston
(1990) and Carlton and Waldman (2002, 2006), I also assume that a tie is irreversible, i.e.,
if the system maker ties its application to the purchase of a system, then a consumer cannot
undo the tie and use the independent suppliers application. The case of a reversible tie is
discussed in Section V.D.
A. The Second Period
I start by solving the price competition subgame that takes place in the second period.
Denote by pA0B the price of A0B; pB0 the price of B0; mjt=2 the system makers second
period prots, and B0 the independent suppliers (post entry) prots.
Proposition 3 Full compatibility (incompatibility) maximizes (minimizes) mjt=2 and B0 :
Proof. Since the tie is irreversible, no one will buy both A0B and B0. Therefore, in an inte-
rior solution, consumers located to the left of some x upgrade to A0B (network 1) whereas
others keep A (network 2) and buy B0. We must have  tx pA0B+n[a12(1 x)+x] =  t(1 
x) pB0+n[(1 x)+a21x]; hence the marginal consumer is located at x = [pA0B pB0 t+n(1 
a12)]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t] and mjt=2 = pA0B[pA0B pB0 t+n(1 a12)]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t]:
The system makers FOC is pA0B   pB0   t + n(1   a12) + pA0B = 0: Similarly, we can get
B0 = pB0 [n(1 a21) t pA0B+pB0 ]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t] and n(1 a21) t pA0B+2pB0 = 0:
Solving, we obtain pB0 = t+
1
3
[n(2a21+a12 3)]; pA0B = t+ 13 [n(a21+2a12 3)]; x = [n3 ( a21+
a12) t+n(1 a12)]=[n(2 a21 a12) 2t]; mjt=2 = ft [n3 (3 a21 2a12)]g2=[2t n(2 a21 a12)];
and B0 = ft [n3 (3 2a21 a12)]g2=[2t n(2 a21 a12)]: Di¤erentiating and noting that t > n,
we get @
@a21
mjt=2 = n9 (t  n+ na21) (3t  3n+ 2na12 + na21) = (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 > 0;
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@
@a12
mjt=2 = n9 (3t  3n+ 2na12 + na21) (5t 5n+2na12+3na21)= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 >
0; @
@a21
B0 =
n
9
(5t  5n+ 2na21 + 3na12) (3t  3n+ 2na21 + na12) = (2t  2n+ na21 + na12)2 >
0 and @
@a12
B0 =
n
9
(t  n+ na21) (3t  3n+ na21 + 2na12) = (2t  2n+ na21 + na12)2 > 0.
This means that both mjt=2 and B0 are maximized (minimized) at a21 = a12 = 1 (a21 =
a12 = 0):
It is not di¢ cult to see the intuition behind the result. If A0B or AB0 are not fully
compatible, then a users choice between two applications is also a choice between two
network systems. This means that gaining an additional customer not only increases a rms
sales but also makes its network more attractive to other users. Therefore, each rm has a
strong incentive to cut price and increase its market share.29 This intensies competition
and lowers both rmsprots.
A result analogous to Corollary 1 can be obtained.
Corollary 1 The number of users who upgrade to the new system x increases with a12 but
decreases with a21:
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3, we know that x = [n
3
( a21 + a12)   t + n(1  
a12)]=[n(2   a21   a12)   2t]: Hence, @x@a12 = 13n(t   n + na21)= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)
2 > 0;
@x
@a21
=  1
3
n(t  n+ na12)= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 < 0:
B. The First Period
In the monopoly case, the system maker reverses its choices of tying and compatibility when
it gains the ability to commit. Here again, the system maker faces a time inconsistency
problem: in order to increase a consumers willingness to pay for the original system, it
may want to lower the prices of applications. From the proof of Proposition 3, we can
see that pB0 = t + n3 (2a21 + a12   3) and pA0B = t + n3 (a21 + 2a12   3); the prices of both
29It is worth noting that decreasing a21 has two competing e¤ects on the system makers prot: on one
hand, it increases the system makers market share; on the other hand, it intensies price competition.
Interestingly, the market share e¤ect is dominated by the price e¤ect. The reason is not di¢ cult to see: a
lower a21 gives the independent supplier a greater incentive to enlarge its network through price cuts.
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applications increase with the degree of compatibility between systems. This means that, by
lowering the degree of compatibility between systems, the system maker can commit itself
to a more intense price competition in the application market and force its rival to accept
a low price. On the other hand, incompatibility may lead to a loss of network benets and
reduce a consumers willingness to pay for the original system. The right balance requires
some degree of incompatibility that minimizes the loss of network benets. According to
Corollary 2, if the new system is only backward compatible, then the number of users who
upgrade will be maximized and the loss of network benets will be small.
At the same time, the system maker has an incentive to accommodate entry of its ri-
val, because its existence makes the system more valuable to consumers. In this way, the
system maker can take advantage of its monopoly position in the system market to capture
the additional surplus that its rivals presence generates (due to product di¤erentiation).
Therefore,
Proposition 4 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the system maker commits to
selling A0B that is backward but not fully forward compatible and accommodates entry.
More specically, a12 = 1 and a

21 = max(0; a); where a is the solution to [t   2n3 (1  
a)]2= (2t  n(1  a)) = F:
Proof. Suppose that a12 and a21 are chosen such that the independent supplier does not
enter, then the price of the upgrade will be u+ n  t so that all users upgrade. There is no
monopoly exclusion because u is high. Hence consumers are willing to pay 0 for the original
system and the system makers total prots are u+ n  t:
Suppose that the independent supplier enters, then the marginal consumer (the user
located at x) is willing to pay u+n[x+a12(1 x)] tx pA0B for the original system, where
x and pA0B are given in the proof of Proposition 3. Thus the system makers total prots are
m = u+n[x
+a12(1 x)] tx pA0B+mjt=2. Di¤erentiating and noting that t > n, we get
@m
@a12
= n
9
[4n(t n)(a12+2a21)+6(t n)2+n2(2a12a21+a212+3a221)]= (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 >
0 and @m
@a21
=  2n
9
(3t  3n+ 2na12 + na21) (t  n+ na21) = (2t  2n+ na12 + na21)2 < 0: In
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Fa21
πm(entry)
πe
πm(no entry)
Profits
a21* 1
Figure 3: A system makers total prots when there is a competitive supplier of applications
and a12 = 1:
addition, we have m(a12 = a21 = 1) = u+n t = m(no entry). This means that the system
maker benets from entry of the independent supplier. Since a higher a12 increases both the
independent suppliers and the system makers prots, we must have a12 = 1: As for a21; it
depends on the size of the entry cost. If F < (t  2
3
n)2=(2t n); then the independent supplier
always enter regardless of a21 hence it should be set to 0; if F  (t  23n)2=(2t  n); then a21
should be set just high enough such that B0 = [t   2n3 (1   a21)]2= [2t  n(1  a21)] = F in
order to accommodate entry. This implies backward but not forward compatibility, where
users of AB0 receive only partial benets from users of A0B.
The trade-o¤ faced by the system maker is illustrated in Figure 3, in which m(entry)
(respectively, m(no entry)) denotes the system makers total prots if the independent
supplier enters (respectively, does not enter) and e denotes the independent suppliers post-
entry prot. On one hand, the system maker benets from the presence of the independent
supplier since m(entry) > m(no entry) for all values of a21; on the other hand, the system
makers total prots decrease with a21: At the same time, the independent suppliers post-
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entry prot increases with a21. Therefore, the optimal strategy for the system maker is to
set a21 just high enough so that the independent supplier will choose to enter.30
By committing to a tie-in of the application with an upgrade that is only backward
compatible, the system maker promises a tough ght with the independent supplier of ap-
plications upon its entry. This increases a consumers willingness to pay for the original
system and raises the system makers overall protability at its rivals expense. In other
words, tying enhances the system makers ability to engage in a price squeeze: by forcing
the independent supplier to charge a lower price than it otherwise would, the system maker
captures surplus created by entry of the independent supplier.
Here, tying is protable precisely because it gives the system maker the leverage to change
the rules of the game in the application market. If the system maker sells its application
as a separate product, then the competition in the application market is just a competition
between two di¤erentiated products; but if the system maker ties the sale of its application
to a new system, then users who prefer the independent supplier will keep the old system
whereas users who prefer the system maker will have to upgrade to a new system and move
to a di¤erent network. Basically, tying turns the competition between two applications into a
competition between two network systems, thus allowing the system maker to take advantage
of its control over the system design and its ability to manipulate the degree of compatibility.
The above result contrasts with that of Whinston (1990), who shows under a wide variety
of conditions that a monopolist cannot gain from tying complementary products used in xed
proportions. The key di¤erence is the inter-temporal nature of my model. Note that tying
is not protable if the system maker can commit to a low upgrade price and use it to engage
in a perfect price squeeze. In Whinstons model, a commitment in price is readily available
because components of a system are o¤ered all at once. In my model, however, an upgrade
is o¤ered after the system purchase and a commitment in the upgrade price may not be
30It is worth noting that the exact form of backward compatibility derived in my model di¤ers from the
denition used in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), according to which users of the old version gains zero
network benets from users of the new version.
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feasible.31 ;32 Therefore, a system maker has to resort to tying, which partially restores its
ability to engage in a price squeeze.
My model is also distinctive from existing foreclosure models in terms of the role of
tying: instead of limiting consumerschoices in the application market, tying is used by a
system maker in my model to limit consumerschoices in the system market among its own
products. Note that consumers upgrade to A0B because B is not available for users of the
original system, even though they are free to add B0 from the independent supplier. To put
it another way, it is the abandonment of old systems, but not the integration with a new
system or the exclusion of rival products, that makes the tie-in of applications so appealing
to the system maker. This distinction implies that policy makers focusing on the physical
integration of applications may have targeted the wrong subject, a point that I will return
to later in this section.
Corollary 2 The system makers total prots decreases with F:
Proof. First, a increases with F ; second, m decreases with a21 = max(0; a): Therefore, m
(weakly) decreases with F:
Since the system maker can manipulate the degree of compatibility between its systems
such that the independent suppliers post entry prots barely cover the entry cost, any e¢ -
ciency gain by the independent supplier in the form of a lower xed cost will be appropriated
by the system maker. Therefore, the system maker may have an incentive to provide open
standards in order to facilitate the development of third-party applications,33 even when it
introduces incompatibility between its own products.
31Carlton and Waldman (2006) also show that tying can be protable if a monopoly system maker cannot
commit to upgrade prices, but their emphasis is on application upgrades, not system upgrades. Their model
predicts foreclosure, whereas mine predicts entry accommodation.
32It is not di¢ cult to see that the price commitment outcome can be obtained under a lease-only policy.
33"Windows is a piece of intellectual property whose facilitiesare totally open to partners and competitors
alike. Windowsprogramming interfaces are published free of charge, so millions of independent software
developers can make use of its built-in facilities (eg, the user interface) in the applications they design." Bill
Gates, "Compete, Dont Delete", The Economist, 06/13/98.
22
It should be noted that results obtained in this section rely on the assumption that the
system maker can o¤er an upgrade price only available to owners of the rst-generation sys-
tem. If the system maker sells an integrated system as an upgrade in period 2 but cannot
price discriminate between upgrading users and rst-time buyers, then consumers will have
an incentive to delay their purchases thus making the tying strategy less protable. Never-
theless, in durable goods markets the assumption of price discrimination is quite realistic and
it can be easily implemented by a trade-in program, as shown in Choi (1994) and Fudenberg
and Tirole (1998). Examples are also abundant. According to Choi (1994), a new release
of Microsoft Windows 3.1 operating system for IBM compatible computers is list priced at
$149.95, but a special upgrade price of $49.99 is also available for registered users of all
Window versions if the master copy of a previous version is turned in.
C. Welfare
The system makers policy of tying the application into an upgrade that is only backward
compatible has two e¤ects: rst, forward incompatibility reduces total network benets;
second, it distorts some consumerspurchase decisions and increases their transportation
costs. Social welfare is lower as a result.34 In fact,
Proposition 5 Social welfare is maximized when a12 = 1 and a21 = 1:
Proof. The total surplus is determined by both network benets and transportation costs.
It can be written as TS = xNfF (x) + a12[1   F (x)]g + (1   x)Nfa21F (x) + [1  
F (x)]g   R x
0
txf(x)dx   R 1
x t(1   x)f(x)dx; where x is the location of the marginal user
and F () is the CDF that represents the distribution of users on the line of [0; 1]. Since
f(x) is symmetric, it is easy to see that TS  N(1)  R x
0
txf(x)dx  R 1
x t(1  x)f(x)dx 
N (1)  R 0:5
0
txf(x)dx  R 1
0:5
t(1  x)f(x)dx, where the last term is TS(a12 = 1; a21 = 1):
34It is worth noting that entry of the independent supplier is ine¢ cient if F > t=4; and in such a case the
system makers incentive to accommodate entry induces ine¢ cient entry.
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The welfare analysis above suggests that a ban on tie-in of application and system may
improve social welfare, however, such a ban is e¤ective only if the system maker starts to
o¤er applications that work with the old system. Otherwise, even in the absence of physical
bundling, a tie remains and may lead to ine¢ cient upgrades. A case in point is the European
Commissions antitrust ruling that orders Microsoft to o¤er Windows XP N, a version of
Windows XP without a bundled media player, in European markets. Since Microsofts new
media player is incompatible with old versions of Windows, in order to use it, users will still
have to upgrade to Windows XP. In fact, there is virtually no demand for the stripped-down
version, particularly as Microsoft has been allowed to o¤er Windows XP N for the same price
as the standard version of Windows XP.
It should be noted, however, that EUs ruling is based on theories that are di¤erent
from the model presented in this paper. It is therefore not surprising that the prescription
suggested by this analysis also di¤ers from EUs actual ruling.
V. Extensions
In this section, I consider extensions of the basic model to check robustness of the results.
A. Uncertainty In Consumer Valuation
In the monopoly case of the basic model, consumers valuations of B are distributed on
the support of [a; b] and each consumer is assumed to know her valuation when making the
initial purchase of the system. This is somewhat unrealistic. In this extension, I assume that
consumersvaluations still have the same distribution, but a consumer learns her valuation
of B only after its introduction by the monopolist in the second period.
Clearly, this does not change the monopolists second period problem. Now I verify
that the solution to the monopolists commitment problem does not change under the new
specication in timing.
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In the second period, each consumer in [a; u] gets a utility of NfF (u)+ a21[1 F (u)]g
and each consumer in [u; b] gets u p+Nfa12F (u)+[1 F (u)]g: Uncertainty in valuation
means that consumers are identical ex ante, hence they have the same willingness to pay
for the system. This determines the original system price, which will be NfF (u) + a21[1 
F (u)]g + R b
u uf(u)du   u[(1   F (u)]: It is also easy to nd the price of the upgrade
p = u +Nfa12F (u) + [1  F (u)]g  NfF (u) + a21[1  F (u)]g:
Therefore, the monopolists total prots aremaxu NfF (u)+a21[1 F (u)]g+
R b
u uf(u)du 
u[(1  F (u)] + [1  F (u)](u +Nfa12F (u) + [1  F (u)]g  NfF (u) + a21[1  F (u)]g):
By the envelope theorem, @
@a12
= @
@a21
= [1   F (u)]F (u)N 0 > 0: Hence a12 = a21 = 1
(full compatibility) maximizes monopoly prots. Introducing uncertainty does not a¤ect the
result.
B. Uncertainty in Entry Cost
In the competitive case of the basic model, I assume that the system maker knows the entry
cost of the independent supplier and thus can ne tune its entry accommodation strategy.
Now I consider the case in which the independent suppliers entry cost is private information.
Suppose that entry costs, F , are represented by a cumulative distribution function G(F ).
The independent supplier enters if and only if F  B0 = [t n3 (3 2a21 a12)]2=[2t n(2 a21 
a12)]. So the system makers expected total prots are E(m) = m(no entry)+[m(entry) 
m(no entry)]G(B0); where m(no entry) = u+ n  t. Let  = m(entry)  m(no entry):
Both  and B0 increase with a12 so we must have a12 = 1: From the proof of 4, we
know that  decreases with a21 but B0 increases with a21; hence E(m) is maximized at
a21 2 (0; 1): Therefore, backward but not forward compatibility is still optimal.
Example 2 Suppose that entry costs are uniformly distributed on [0; t=2]. In this case,
E() /   B0 = n (a12   a21) [3t   n(3   2a12   a21)]3=[2t   n(2   a12   a21)]2:
Since @
@a12
(  B0) = n (3t  3n+ na12 + 2na21)2 (2t  2n+ na12 + na21) 3
 (5nta12   12nt+ 7nta21 + 6n2 + 6t2   5n2a12   7n2a21 + n2a12a21 + 2n2a212 + 3n2a221) > 0;
25
we have a12 = 1: The rst-order condition with respect to a21 is
@
@a21
(  B0) = n (3t  3n+ na12 + 2na21)2 (2t  2n+ na12 + na21) 3
 (13nta21   nta12   12nt+ 6n2 + 6t2 + n2a12   13n2a21 + 5n2a12a21   3n2a212 + 4n2a221) = 0:
Substituting a12 = 1 into the FOC, we get a

21 = 0:443t=n:
Note that if the entry cost is publicly known and equals the expected value in the private
information case, i.e., F = t=4; then a21 = 0:382t=n; quite close to the solution in the private
information case.
C. New Customers
In the basic model, the system makers choice of tying is driven by its desire to increase the
price of the original system. One may wonder whether its incentive to tie the application
changes if some customers do not make system purchases until the second period. To answer
this question, I extend the basic model by assuming that some customers (in the size of s)
enter the market in the second period and that they are otherwise identical to customers
that enter in the rst period.35
In the monopoly case, it is clear that the system makers ex post incentive to introduce
backward but not forward compatible upgrade is strengthened because new customerspur-
chases of the upgrade increases its pull to old customers. At the same time, the system
makers ex ante incentive to make a commitment to full compatibility remains the same.
It is not di¢ cult to see why: the system makers total prots will have an additional term
related to the network benets of new customers, sN [1   F (u) + s + a12F (u)], but it is
increasing in a12 and independent of a21:
In the competitive case, the existence of new customers gives the system maker an incen-
tive not to tie its application, but it is advantageous only if the number of new customers is
su¢ ciently large. To see this, we rst observe the following: since the system maker will set
a discounted upgrade price for owners of the original system and the independent supplier
35I do not specify an exogenous attrition process because attrition is endogenous in my model: rst-period
consumers who choose not to upgrade leave the market in the second period.
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Figure 4: The system maker always benets from entry of an independent supplier. It earns
a higher prot from unbundling than from bundling a fully compatible upgrade. It may or
may not choose to bundle a backward but not forward upgrade, depending on the relative
size of new customers.
can only sell to these customers, the earlier analysis on rmspricing strategies involving old
customers continues to apply.
Now consider the new customer segment. Here the equivalence between unbundling and
full compatibility breaks down. Recall that the equivalence holds in the basic model because
old customers buy an upgrade after their system purchases and the system maker cannot
precommit to an upgrade price in the rst period. New customers, however, buy the system
and the application simultaneously, therefore a commitment to a low price in the application
is readily available. Since the system is essential for the use of the application, according to
Whinston (1990, Proposition 3), it is more protable not to tie.
Taking into account the competing e¤ects of tying in the two consumer segments, we can
conclude that the system maker continues to tie when it expects relatively few new customers
and chooses not to tie if it expects a large number of new customers (see Figure 4).
D. Reversible Tie
Following Whinston (1990) and Carlton and Waldman (2002, 2006), in the basic model
I have assumed that ties are not reversible, i.e., when the system maker tied its system
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and application consumers could not reverse the tie and add the independent suppliers
application. In this discussion I consider what happens if this assumption is relaxed.
One possibility is that ties are reversible at a cost. That is, when the system maker
ties it is possible but costly for a consumer to add an alternative application. For hardware
systems, the extra cost may be the labor used to remove parts; for software systems, it may
be the hassle of changing le associations or the possible conicts between two applications.
In all these cases, if the cost is su¢ ciently large, then old customers will not upgrade to a
tied system and attempt to undo the tie; therefore a competition between applications will
still be a competition between two network systems, so the basic model still applies. At the
same time, if there are new customers, then they will have to incur the necessary cost to
undo the tie in order to use an alternative application. Hence, in the equilibrium, there may
be both customers who choose to reverse the tie and those who choose not to.
Suppose instead that ties are completely reversible, i.e., when the system maker ties its
products there is no added cost associated with consumers adding an alternative application
onto a tied system. In this case a consumer has a third choice: a choice of upgrading to A0B
and buying B0: A consumer may choose to do so if the price of the upgrade is lower than
the additional network benets that it brings. Since consumers value network benets the
same way, price cuts by the system maker have discontinuous payo¤s. This means that when
the two systems are not fully compatible, a pure strategy equilibrium in simultaneous move
pricing game (in period 2) does not exist. This, coupled with the multiplicity of equilibrium
due to network externalities, makes the analysis di¢ cult.36 Nevertheless, I argue in the
following that a system maker will never nd it optimal to make the upgrade fully compatible
with the old system. In other words, it will always tie its application to a new system, even
if the tie can be reversed.
36Since consumers are heterogeneous, they may not all have the same ordering of the possible equilibria, so
we cannot use a Pareto criterion to select between the equilibria. Suppose that the price of the new system
is between n and n(1  x); then a user on the immediate left of x prefers all users upgrade (she can now use
B0), and a user on the immediate right of x prefers not to upgrade (cost exceeds the benet.)
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To see this, let us suppose that the system maker chooses a12 = 1 and a21 = 1   ";
where " << 1: Clearly this is more protable than full compatibility if the tie is irreversible,
according to the proof of Proposition 4. We just need to check whether the system maker will
follow the same equilibrium pricing strategy as in the basic model when a tie is reversible.
Note that in order to sell the upgrade to customers who will undo the tie, the system maker
must set the upgrade price below n" and thus earn a prot in the order of " in period 2, but
such a deviation cannot be protable if " is small. Knowing this, the independent supplier
also has no incentive to change its pricing strategy. Therefore, as long as " is su¢ ciently
small, having a reversible tie does not a¤ect period 2 subgame equilibrium outcome. This
means that the analysis in the proof of Proposition 4 still applies: moving away from full
compatibility always increases the system makers prots. In the Appendix, I also show that
if rms set prices sequentially in period 2, then a pure strategy equilibrium exists, in which
committing to backward but not forward compatibility (a12 = 1; a21 = 0) is more protable
than full compatibility.
E. Mixed Bundling
One may wonder whether the system maker has an incentive to o¤er B along with A0B:
There are two possibilities, depending on whether B is compatible with A: First, if B is
incompatible with A; then it is equivalent to selling only A0B: Second, if B is compatible
with A; then it is equivalent to selling a version of A0B that is fully compatible with A;
according to Lemma 1. Denote it by AB: Between AB and A0B; the only di¤erence is the
network e¤ects. Since users value network e¤ects the same way, they will make the same
choice in the equilibrium. This means that the system maker will be able to sell either AB or
A0B; but not both. Therefore, mixed bundling, o¤ering both AB and A0B; does not increase
the system makers prots.
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F. Myopic Consumers
Although my analysis is based on the assumption of forward-looking consumers, it is not
di¢ cult to nd the system makers optimizing strategy when there are myopic consumers.
A commitment in the rst period will not increase a myopic consumers willingness to pay,
so the system maker will also act myopically and reverse its strategy completely: in the
monopoly case, it will choose to integrate the application into an upgrade that is only
backward compatible; but in the competitive case, it will sell its application as a separate
product or sell an upgrade that is fully compatible with the old system. In both cases,
the system maker can introduce two systems to separate myopic consumers from forward-
looking consumers, with the latter group paying a premium for a system that o¤ers a higher
second-period utility.
It is also easy to see that the above results are also obtained if the system maker is unable
to commit to its future tying strategies.
VI. Discussions and Conclusion
This paper explores a system makers incentives to provide upgraded versions of its system
and its choice of compatibility. It shows that tying applications into an upgrade that is only
backward compatible generates higher prots when network externalities are present. As a
result, the system maker may introduce more upgrades than optimal. A commitment not
to upgrade or a commitment to full compatibility may increase the system makers total
prots. However, if the system maker faces competition from an independent supplier of
applications, then it may again introduce the upgrade, even if a commitment of not doing
so is available and socially optimal.
The market conduct of a monopoly system maker such as Microsoft has been under
constant scrutiny by regulators. A major concern of the regulators is its use of tying as an
exclusionary device. My paper suggests that tying can be harmful even when its use by a
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monopolist does not lead to exclusion of rivals. Ironically, tying is protable in my model
precisely because it commits the system maker to a vigorous competition in the application
market.
Although my analysis provides arguments in favor of the hypothesis of planned obsoles-
cence, its welfare implications are less clear. Even in the simple models considered here,
which ignores a number of other possible motivations for the practice, the impact of tying on
welfare depends on the market structure and model parameters. Moreover, my results are
obtained under an assumption of weak network externalities. This means that welfare loss,
if any, may not be signicant enough to warrant heavy-handed government interventions.
While the models presented in this paper are su¢ ciently general, there are some strong
assumptions that can potentially be relaxed. First, the models ignore entry into the system
market; second, the system makers incentive to engage in R&D is assumed to be exogenous.
Future studies that incorporate more realistic elements can help us better understand the
issues discussed in this paper.
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A Sequential Move Pricing in Period 2
In the following, I assume that the system maker sets price rst in period 2. I look for
an equilibrium, in which all players have beliefs that consumers who prefer the alternative
application will upgrade and undo the tie if pA0B  n but will choose not to upgrade if
pA0B > n. These beliefs are consistent with consumerschoices.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the system maker chooses backward but not forward compati-
bility (a12 = 1; a21 = 0) and t9(11  2
p
10) < n < t; then a pure strategy equilibrium exists in
the sequential move pricing game. In this equilibrium, pA0B = n and pB0 = t2 ; all consumers
upgrade but 1
4
of them undo the tie and buy an application from the independent supplier.
Proof. It is easy to see that the independent supplier and consumers will not deviate from
their equilibrium strategies. We just need to verify the system maker has no incentive to
deviate from its equilibrium price. If pA0B > n; then consumers who prefer the alternative
application will choose not to upgrade and prices will be set as if the tie were irreversible.
Solving, we get pA0B = (3t  n)=2; pB0 = (5t  3n)=4 and mjt=2 = (n  3t)2 =8(2t  n): But
mjt=2 is smaller than n; the system makers period 2 prot when pA0B = n.
According to Proposition 6, if the system maker chooses only backward compatibility,
then consumers are willing to pay u   3
4
t for the original system. This gives the system
maker a total prot of u + n   3
4
t; which is greater than u + n   21
16
t;37 its prot under full
compatibility, or u+n t; its prot when the independent supplier is excluded. Interestingly,
some consumers will undo the tie, yet the tie forces all consumers, including those who will
undo the tie, to buy the upgrade and allows the system maker to extract rents from its rival.
It is also straightforward to verify that if n  t
9
(11   2p10); then a pure strategy equi-
librium exists such that consumers who buy the alternative application keep the old system.
In this equilibrium, pA0B = 12(3t  n); pB0 = 54t  34n: The system maker earns a total prot
of u+ n+ 1
8
(n  3t) (3n  7t)=(n  2t); still greater than its prot under full compatibility.
37It is not u+ n  t; as in the basic model, because here rms set prices sequentially.
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